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NEWS AND INFORMATION山東股權激勵:激勵載體怎么選,直接持股還是間接持股?
發(fā)布時間:2025-10-25 來源:http://www.aibangwang.cn/
股權激勵是激發(fā)員工積極性、加強團隊凝聚力和提高經(jīng)營效率的重要手段。在股權激勵的實施過程中,激勵對象可以直接持有公司股權,也可以通過持股平臺間接持有公司股權。公司可根據(jù)激勵目標、員工類別和預期效果,結合實際情況選擇最合適的激勵載體。以下是一些可供考量的選擇因素,供企業(yè)家參考。
Equity incentives are an important means to stimulate employee motivation, strengthen team cohesion, and improve business efficiency. In the implementation process of equity incentives, incentive recipients can directly hold company equity or indirectly hold company equity through shareholding platforms. The company can choose the most suitable incentive carrier based on the incentive goals, employee categories, and expected effects, combined with the actual situation. Here are some selection factors to consider for entrepreneurs to refer to.
一、直接持股直接持股即激勵對象以個人名義直接持有公司股權,具體如下圖所示:
1、 Direct shareholding refers to the incentive object directly holding company equity in their personal name, as shown in the following figure:
1. 優(yōu)勢(1)可行使股東權利,激勵效果明顯激勵對象通過直接持股可以取得股東身份,有權參與公司治理并行使相應的股東權利,直觀的感受自身行為對公司利益的影響,通過與公司利益的緊密綁定,更有助于激發(fā)其工作積極性和創(chuàng)造力。(2)減持便捷,符合條件可享受稅收優(yōu)惠若公司未來擬登陸資本市場,直接持股的激勵對象在鎖定期屆滿后便可在二級市場減持,退出渠道通暢。同時,根據(jù)《關于上市公司股息紅利差別化個人所得稅政策有關問題的通知》和《關于繼續(xù)實施全國中小企業(yè)股份轉讓系統(tǒng)掛牌公司股息紅利差別化個人所得稅政策的公告》的相關規(guī)定,持股超過一定期限的激勵對象在繳納股息紅利所得稅時還可以享受一定減免,具體如下:
1. Advantage (1): It is feasible to exercise shareholder rights, and the incentive effect is obvious. The incentive object can obtain shareholder status through direct shareholding, have the right to participate in corporate governance and exercise corresponding shareholder rights, and intuitively feel the impact of their own behavior on the company's interests. By closely binding with the company's interests, it is more conducive to stimulating their work enthusiasm and creativity. (2) Reducing holdings is convenient and eligible for tax incentives. If the company plans to enter the capital market in the future, incentive recipients who directly hold shares can reduce their holdings in the secondary market after the lock up period expires, and the exit channel is smooth. At the same time, according to the relevant provisions of the "Notice on Issues Concerning Differentiated Personal Income Tax Policies for Dividends and Dividends of Listed Companies" and the "Announcement on Continuing to Implement Differentiated Personal Income Tax Policies for Dividends and Dividends of Listed Companies on the National Equities Exchange and Quotations", incentive recipients who hold shares for more than a certain period of time can also enjoy certain reductions and exemptions when paying dividend income tax, as follows:
2. 劣勢(1)增加公司的管理成本對于公司而言,如果直接持有公司股權的激勵對象人數(shù)較多,公司集中管理難度將會成倍增加,例如,當激勵對象因離職等原因?qū)е鲁止汕闆r頻繁變動的,公司將不得不辦理工商登記變更手續(xù)并履行相關內(nèi)部決策程序,對公司的高效運營產(chǎn)生不利影響。(2)增加股權分散的風險直接持股可能導致公司股權過于分散,影響公司的控制權穩(wěn)定。比如,當眾多激勵對象與公司創(chuàng)始人的意見發(fā)生分歧時,通過股東會投反對票可能會阻礙公司快速形成有效決策。又如,若公司未能對激勵股權設置限售規(guī)定或激勵股權已經(jīng)解除限售的,激勵對象將有權通過股權轉讓的方式為公司引入新的股東,這可能導致公司股權結構的變動不受創(chuàng)始團隊控制,包括但不限于引入不適格股東影響公司IPO進程、引入存在競業(yè)限制的人員影響公司業(yè)務拓展等。除股東因出資瑕疵導致失權外,新《公司法》和現(xiàn)行《公司法》均未規(guī)定股東強制除名/失權的其他制度,即在公司與激勵對象出現(xiàn)不可調(diào)和的矛盾時,公司較難形成有效股東會決議強制要求激勵對象退出公司。(3)激勵人數(shù)有限需要特別注意的是,對于非公眾公司而言,有限責任公司應當由50個以下股東出資設立,股份有限公司的發(fā)起人不得超過200人。向特定對象發(fā)行證券累計超過200人的將被視為《證券法》的公開發(fā)行,需報經(jīng)國務院證券監(jiān)督管理機構或者國務院授權的部門注冊。公司在確定直接持股的激勵對象數(shù)量時需注意符合法律法規(guī)的上限規(guī)定。
2. Disadvantage (1) Increased management costs for the company. For the company, if there are a large number of incentive objects directly holding the company's equity, the difficulty of centralized management will increase exponentially. For example, if the incentive objects frequently change their shareholding due to reasons such as resignation, the company will have to handle the procedures for industrial and commercial registration changes and fulfill relevant internal decision-making procedures, which will have a negative impact on the efficient operation of the company. (2) The risk of increasing equity diversification through direct shareholding may lead to excessive diversification of the company's equity, affecting the stability of the company's control. For example, when there are disagreements between the opinions of many incentive targets and the company founder, voting against them through the shareholders' meeting may hinder the company from quickly forming effective decisions. For example, if the company fails to set restrictions on the sale of incentive equity or if the incentive equity has been released from restrictions, the incentive recipient will have the right to introduce new shareholders to the company through equity transfer, which may result in changes in the company's equity structure that are not controlled by the founding team, including but not limited to the introduction of unqualified shareholders affecting the company's IPO process, the introduction of personnel with non compete restrictions affecting the company's business expansion, etc. Except for shareholders who lose their rights due to defects in their capital contributions, neither the new Company Law nor the current Company Law provide for other systems for compulsory expulsion/loss of rights of shareholders. That is, when there is an irreconcilable conflict between the company and the incentive object, it is difficult for the company to form an effective shareholder meeting resolution to force the incentive object to withdraw from the company. (3) Special attention should be paid to the limited number of incentivized individuals. For non-public companies, a limited liability company should be established with contributions from no more than 50 shareholders, and the number of initiators for a joint stock limited company should not exceed 200. Issuing securities to a specific target with a cumulative total of more than 200 people will be considered as a public offering under the Securities Law and must be registered with the securities regulatory authority under the State Council or a department authorized by the State Council. When determining the number of incentive targets for direct shareholding, companies should pay attention to complying with the upper limit provisions of laws and regulations.
3. 適用的激勵對象類型通過直接持股方式激勵的員工不宜過多,激勵對象通常適用于公司的高級管理人員、核心技術人員以及對公司發(fā)展有重大貢獻的少數(shù)核心員工。在確認直接持股的激勵對象范圍前,公司應對激勵對象的工作能力及職業(yè)操守進行深入了解和細致評估,確保該等直接持股的激勵對象對公司的發(fā)展方向、未來規(guī)劃和戰(zhàn)略目標與創(chuàng)始團隊保持基本一致的認識和期待。
3. The types of incentive objects applicable should not be too many employees who are directly incentivized through shareholding. Incentive objects are usually suitable for senior management personnel, core technical personnel, and a small number of core employees who have made significant contributions to the development of the company. Before confirming the scope of incentive targets for direct shareholding, the company should conduct a thorough understanding and detailed evaluation of the work ability and professional ethics of the incentive targets to ensure that they have a fundamentally consistent understanding and expectation of the company's development direction, future plans, and strategic goals with the founding team.
二、間接持股間接持股指激勵對象通過持股平臺間接持有公司股權,實務中,常用的持股平臺主要包括有限責任公司、有限合伙企業(yè)兩類,具體如下圖所示:
2、 Indirect shareholding is an incentive for indirect stock index holders to indirectly hold company equity through shareholding platforms. In practice, commonly used shareholding platforms mainly include limited liability companies and limited partnership enterprises, as shown in the following figure:
1. 優(yōu)勢(1)保持公司控制權穩(wěn)定通過間接持股的方式,創(chuàng)始人可通過控制持股平臺來增強對公司的控制權,并進一步主導持股平臺表決權的行使。比如,以公司作為持股平臺的,持股超過50%即可取得相對控制權,持股超過67%即享有絕對控制權;新《公司法》實施后,持股平臺也可以通過設置特別表決權股的方式,使創(chuàng)始人以較少的股權享有對持股平臺具有控制力的投票權;如以有限合伙企業(yè)作為持股平臺的,創(chuàng)始人僅需持有較少的合伙份額并擔任普通合伙人便可實現(xiàn)對持股平臺的控制,在該等情形下,盡管創(chuàng)始人作為普通合伙人需對合伙企業(yè)承擔無限責任,但若該合伙企業(yè)僅作為員工持股平臺的載體而無其他經(jīng)營安排的,其整體風險相對可控。如創(chuàng)始人仍希望進一步降低無限責任風險的,可以考慮通過再設立一個夾層公司擔任普通合伙人來實現(xiàn)。(2)便于統(tǒng)一管理及風險隔離當激勵對象因離職等原因需要退出股權激勵計劃時,間接持股的安排僅需在持股平臺內(nèi)部調(diào)整股權結構或合伙份額,操作簡單快捷,不會直接影響公司的股權結構。就兩種持股平臺對比而言,有限合伙企業(yè)比有限責任公司更具有人合性,合伙人之間的權利義務關系、收益分配方式、入伙退伙程序等均可以通過合伙協(xié)議自行約定。除此之外,實踐中往往通過合伙協(xié)議授予執(zhí)行事務合伙人較大權限,除法定保留事項外,執(zhí)行事務合伙人有權單獨處理絕大部分合伙事務,包括但不限于授權其辦理退伙事項并簽署變更所需文件的權利,激勵對象進出程序靈活,這樣的設置使得有限合伙企業(yè)持股平臺更有利于公司及創(chuàng)始人加強對持股平臺的控制和對激勵對象的約束。此外,當激勵對象與公司發(fā)生爭議時,直接持股的形式極容易演變?yōu)楣蓶|訴訟,而設置持股平臺的作用,在于這道“防火墻”可以使得該等訴訟或糾紛能夠在持股平臺內(nèi)解決,從而達到風險隔離的效果。(3)上市時不直接受鎖定規(guī)則限制新《公司法》及現(xiàn)行《公司法》均規(guī)定,公司公開發(fā)行股份前已發(fā)行的股份,自公司股票在證券交易所上市交易之日起一年內(nèi)不得轉讓,即若公司存在上市計劃且在上市之前已實施股權激勵的,直接持股股東(含激勵對象)鎖定期至少為1年,實際控制人及其一致行動人的近親屬、董監(jiān)高的鎖定期根據(jù)不同上市板塊規(guī)則執(zhí)行。而現(xiàn)行監(jiān)管規(guī)則對激勵對象減持其持有的持股平臺股權或份額未進行限制,即不適用直接持股法定鎖定期1年的規(guī)則,但激勵對象有其他特殊身份,或進行自愿性承諾的除外。(4)擴大股權激勵人數(shù)當公司激勵對象人數(shù)眾多時,間接持股的方式可以通過搭設多個持股平臺,突破直接持股時的股東人數(shù)上限。
1. Advantage (1) Maintaining stable control of the company. Through indirect shareholding, founders can enhance their control over the company by controlling the shareholding platform and further lead the exercise of voting rights on the platform. For example, if a company serves as a holding platform, holding more than 50% of the shares will grant relative control, while holding more than 67% will grant absolute control; After the implementation of the new Company Law, shareholding platforms can also establish special voting rights shares to enable founders to enjoy voting rights that control the shareholding platform with less equity; If a limited partnership enterprise is used as the holding platform, the founder only needs to hold a small number of partnership shares and serve as a general partner to achieve control over the holding platform. In such a situation, although the founder as a general partner needs to bear unlimited liability for the partnership enterprise, if the partnership enterprise only serves as a carrier for employee holding platforms without other business arrangements, its overall risk is relatively controllable. If the founder still wishes to further reduce the risk of unlimited liability, it may be considered to establish another mezzanine company as a general partner to achieve this. (2) For the convenience of unified management and risk isolation, when the incentive object needs to withdraw from the equity incentive plan due to reasons such as resignation, the arrangement of indirect shareholding only requires adjusting the equity structure or partnership shares within the shareholding platform. The operation is simple and fast, and will not directly affect the company's equity structure. Compared to limited liability companies, limited partnerships are more humane in terms of the two types of shareholding platforms. The rights and obligations between partners, the distribution of profits, and the procedures for joining and leaving the partnership can all be agreed upon through the partnership agreement. In addition, in practice, the executing partner is often granted greater authority through a partnership agreement. Except for legally reserved matters, the executing partner has the right to independently handle the vast majority of partnership affairs, including but not limited to the right to authorize them to handle withdrawal matters and sign necessary documents for changes. The incentive objects have flexible entry and exit procedures, which makes the limited partnership enterprise's shareholding platform more conducive to the company and founders strengthening their control over the shareholding platform and constraining the incentive objects. In addition, when there is a dispute between the incentive object and the company, the form of direct shareholding is prone to evolve into shareholder litigation. The role of setting up a shareholding platform is that this "firewall" can enable such litigation or disputes to be resolved within the shareholding platform, thereby achieving the effect of risk isolation. (3) Both the new Company Law and the current Company Law stipulate that shares issued by a company before its public offering shall not be transferred within one year from the date of listing on the stock exchange. If the company has a listing plan and has implemented equity incentives before listing, the lock up period for direct shareholders (including incentive recipients) shall be at least one year. The lock up period for the close relatives, directors, and supervisors of the actual controller and its concerted action persons shall be executed according to the rules of different listing sectors. The current regulatory rules do not restrict incentive recipients from reducing their holdings of equity or shares in the holding platform, that is, the rule of a one-year statutory lock up period for direct shareholding does not apply, except for incentive recipients with other special identities or voluntary commitments. (4) Expanding the number of equity incentives: When a company has a large number of incentive targets, indirect shareholding can be achieved by setting up multiple shareholding platforms to break through the upper limit of direct shareholding.
2. 劣勢(1)退出通道不暢間接持股雖有其優(yōu)勢,但也存在無法回避的劣勢。對于激勵對象而言,間接持有的公司股權在公司IPO時雖不適用直接持股的法定鎖定期,但由于其無法在二級市場減持,因此其流動性和退出通常較直接持股更為狹窄。但對公司而言,這種持股模式可以較好的鼓勵激勵對象更加專注于激勵股權帶來的分紅收益,促使激勵對象積極提升公司利潤,支持和執(zhí)行公司成本控制措施以及各項制度,有助于公司的長期健康發(fā)展。(2)可能涉及雙重繳稅選擇以公司作為持股平臺的,若激勵對象通過轉讓持股平臺直接持有的公司股權實現(xiàn)變現(xiàn)的,就轉讓所得需要雙重征稅,稅收負擔較直接持股和以有限合伙企業(yè)間接持股(詳見前文:創(chuàng)始人如何選擇持股方式?)更重。
2. Disadvantage (1) The exit channel is not smooth. Although indirect shareholding has its advantages, there are also unavoidable disadvantages. For incentive recipients, although indirect holdings of company equity are not subject to the statutory lock up period for direct holdings during the company's IPO, their liquidity and exit are usually narrower than direct holdings because they cannot reduce their holdings in the secondary market. But for companies, this shareholding model can effectively encourage incentive recipients to focus more on the dividend income brought by incentive equity, encourage incentive recipients to actively improve company profits, support and implement cost control measures and various systems, and contribute to the long-term healthy development of the company. (2) Double taxation may be involved in choosing the company as the holding platform. If the incentive object realizes realization by transferring the company's equity directly held by the holding platform, the transfer income needs to be subject to double taxation, and the tax burden is heavier than direct shareholding and indirect shareholding in a limited partnership enterprise (see previous section: How do founders choose shareholding methods?).
3. 適用場景間接持股的激勵方式通常適用于公司的中高層管理人員、業(yè)務骨干以及其他優(yōu)秀員工,在符合各持股平臺人數(shù)上限的情況下,可以通過搭設多個持股平臺激勵更多的員工。
3. The incentive method of indirect shareholding is usually applicable to the middle and senior management, business backbone, and other outstanding employees of the company. In the case of meeting the upper limit of the number of employees on each shareholding platform, more employees can be incentivized by setting up multiple shareholding platforms.
總結
summary
股權流動性:直接持股,較高;間接持股,較低;
Equity liquidity: direct shareholding, relatively high; Indirect shareholding, relatively low;
鎖定期:直接持股,公司上市后至少一年;間接持股,除另有約定、承諾或具有其他需鎖定的身份外,減持其持有的持股平臺股權或份額無限制。;
Lock up period: direct shareholding, at least one year after the company goes public; Indirect shareholding, unless otherwise agreed, promised, or has other identity that needs to be locked, has no restrictions on reducing the equity or shares of the shareholding platform it holds.;
管理難度:直接持股,股權分散,較難管理;激勵對象股權變動將直接改變公司股權結構;間接持股,便于統(tǒng)一管理與約束,保持公司控制權較穩(wěn)定;激勵對象股權變動不直接改變公司股權結構;
Management difficulty: Direct shareholding, dispersed equity, difficult to manage; The equity change of the incentive object will directly change the company's equity structure; Indirect shareholding facilitates unified management and restraint, maintaining stable control over the company; The equity change of the incentive object does not directly change the company's equity structure;
稅收:直接持股,個人所得稅;間接持股,以公司作為持股平臺涉及雙重稅收;
Taxation: direct shareholding, personal income tax; Indirect shareholding, using the company as a shareholding platform involves double taxation;
適用場景:直接持股,高級管理人員、核心技術人員以及對公司發(fā)展有重大貢獻的少數(shù)核心員工;間接持股,中高層管理人員、業(yè)務骨干以及其他優(yōu)秀員工;
Applicable scenarios: direct shareholding, senior management, core technical personnel, and a small number of core employees who have made significant contributions to the company's development; Indirect shareholding, middle and senior management personnel, business backbone, and other outstanding employees;
本文由 山東股權激勵 友情奉獻.更多有關的知識請點擊 http://www.aibangwang.cn/ 真誠的態(tài)度.為您提供為全面的服務.更多有關的知識我們將會陸續(xù)向大家奉獻.敬請期待.
This article is about Shandong Equity Incentive Friendship Dedication For more related knowledge, please click http://www.aibangwang.cn/ Sincere attitude To provide you with comprehensive services We will gradually contribute more relevant knowledge to everyone Coming soon. 股權激勵是激發(fā)員工積極性、加強團隊凝聚力和提高經(jīng)營效率的重要手段。在股權激勵的實施過程中,激勵對象可以直接持有公司股權,也可以通過持股平臺間接持有公司股權。公司可根據(jù)激勵目標、員工類別和預期效果,結合實際情況選擇最合適的激勵載體。以下是一些可供考量的選擇因素,供企業(yè)家參考。
Equity incentives are an important means to stimulate employee motivation, strengthen team cohesion, and improve business efficiency. In the implementation process of equity incentives, incentive recipients can directly hold company equity or indirectly hold company equity through shareholding platforms. The company can choose the most suitable incentive carrier based on the incentive goals, employee categories, and expected effects, combined with the actual situation. Here are some selection factors to consider for entrepreneurs to refer to.
一、直接持股直接持股即激勵對象以個人名義直接持有公司股權,具體如下圖所示:
1、 Direct shareholding refers to the incentive object directly holding company equity in their personal name, as shown in the following figure:
1. 優(yōu)勢(1)可行使股東權利,激勵效果明顯激勵對象通過直接持股可以取得股東身份,有權參與公司治理并行使相應的股東權利,直觀的感受自身行為對公司利益的影響,通過與公司利益的緊密綁定,更有助于激發(fā)其工作積極性和創(chuàng)造力。(2)減持便捷,符合條件可享受稅收優(yōu)惠若公司未來擬登陸資本市場,直接持股的激勵對象在鎖定期屆滿后便可在二級市場減持,退出渠道通暢。同時,根據(jù)《關于上市公司股息紅利差別化個人所得稅政策有關問題的通知》和《關于繼續(xù)實施全國中小企業(yè)股份轉讓系統(tǒng)掛牌公司股息紅利差別化個人所得稅政策的公告》的相關規(guī)定,持股超過一定期限的激勵對象在繳納股息紅利所得稅時還可以享受一定減免,具體如下:
1. Advantage (1): It is feasible to exercise shareholder rights, and the incentive effect is obvious. The incentive object can obtain shareholder status through direct shareholding, have the right to participate in corporate governance and exercise corresponding shareholder rights, and intuitively feel the impact of their own behavior on the company's interests. By closely binding with the company's interests, it is more conducive to stimulating their work enthusiasm and creativity. (2) Reducing holdings is convenient and eligible for tax incentives. If the company plans to enter the capital market in the future, incentive recipients who directly hold shares can reduce their holdings in the secondary market after the lock up period expires, and the exit channel is smooth. At the same time, according to the relevant provisions of the "Notice on Issues Concerning Differentiated Personal Income Tax Policies for Dividends and Dividends of Listed Companies" and the "Announcement on Continuing to Implement Differentiated Personal Income Tax Policies for Dividends and Dividends of Listed Companies on the National Equities Exchange and Quotations", incentive recipients who hold shares for more than a certain period of time can also enjoy certain reductions and exemptions when paying dividend income tax, as follows:
2. 劣勢(1)增加公司的管理成本對于公司而言,如果直接持有公司股權的激勵對象人數(shù)較多,公司集中管理難度將會成倍增加,例如,當激勵對象因離職等原因?qū)е鲁止汕闆r頻繁變動的,公司將不得不辦理工商登記變更手續(xù)并履行相關內(nèi)部決策程序,對公司的高效運營產(chǎn)生不利影響。(2)增加股權分散的風險直接持股可能導致公司股權過于分散,影響公司的控制權穩(wěn)定。比如,當眾多激勵對象與公司創(chuàng)始人的意見發(fā)生分歧時,通過股東會投反對票可能會阻礙公司快速形成有效決策。又如,若公司未能對激勵股權設置限售規(guī)定或激勵股權已經(jīng)解除限售的,激勵對象將有權通過股權轉讓的方式為公司引入新的股東,這可能導致公司股權結構的變動不受創(chuàng)始團隊控制,包括但不限于引入不適格股東影響公司IPO進程、引入存在競業(yè)限制的人員影響公司業(yè)務拓展等。除股東因出資瑕疵導致失權外,新《公司法》和現(xiàn)行《公司法》均未規(guī)定股東強制除名/失權的其他制度,即在公司與激勵對象出現(xiàn)不可調(diào)和的矛盾時,公司較難形成有效股東會決議強制要求激勵對象退出公司。(3)激勵人數(shù)有限需要特別注意的是,對于非公眾公司而言,有限責任公司應當由50個以下股東出資設立,股份有限公司的發(fā)起人不得超過200人。向特定對象發(fā)行證券累計超過200人的將被視為《證券法》的公開發(fā)行,需報經(jīng)國務院證券監(jiān)督管理機構或者國務院授權的部門注冊。公司在確定直接持股的激勵對象數(shù)量時需注意符合法律法規(guī)的上限規(guī)定。
2. Disadvantage (1) Increased management costs for the company. For the company, if there are a large number of incentive objects directly holding the company's equity, the difficulty of centralized management will increase exponentially. For example, if the incentive objects frequently change their shareholding due to reasons such as resignation, the company will have to handle the procedures for industrial and commercial registration changes and fulfill relevant internal decision-making procedures, which will have a negative impact on the efficient operation of the company. (2) The risk of increasing equity diversification through direct shareholding may lead to excessive diversification of the company's equity, affecting the stability of the company's control. For example, when there are disagreements between the opinions of many incentive targets and the company founder, voting against them through the shareholders' meeting may hinder the company from quickly forming effective decisions. For example, if the company fails to set restrictions on the sale of incentive equity or if the incentive equity has been released from restrictions, the incentive recipient will have the right to introduce new shareholders to the company through equity transfer, which may result in changes in the company's equity structure that are not controlled by the founding team, including but not limited to the introduction of unqualified shareholders affecting the company's IPO process, the introduction of personnel with non compete restrictions affecting the company's business expansion, etc. Except for shareholders who lose their rights due to defects in their capital contributions, neither the new Company Law nor the current Company Law provide for other systems for compulsory expulsion/loss of rights of shareholders. That is, when there is an irreconcilable conflict between the company and the incentive object, it is difficult for the company to form an effective shareholder meeting resolution to force the incentive object to withdraw from the company. (3) Special attention should be paid to the limited number of incentivized individuals. For non-public companies, a limited liability company should be established with contributions from no more than 50 shareholders, and the number of initiators for a joint stock limited company should not exceed 200. Issuing securities to a specific target with a cumulative total of more than 200 people will be considered as a public offering under the Securities Law and must be registered with the securities regulatory authority under the State Council or a department authorized by the State Council. When determining the number of incentive targets for direct shareholding, companies should pay attention to complying with the upper limit provisions of laws and regulations.
3. 適用的激勵對象類型通過直接持股方式激勵的員工不宜過多,激勵對象通常適用于公司的高級管理人員、核心技術人員以及對公司發(fā)展有重大貢獻的少數(shù)核心員工。在確認直接持股的激勵對象范圍前,公司應對激勵對象的工作能力及職業(yè)操守進行深入了解和細致評估,確保該等直接持股的激勵對象對公司的發(fā)展方向、未來規(guī)劃和戰(zhàn)略目標與創(chuàng)始團隊保持基本一致的認識和期待。
3. The types of incentive objects applicable should not be too many employees who are directly incentivized through shareholding. Incentive objects are usually suitable for senior management personnel, core technical personnel, and a small number of core employees who have made significant contributions to the development of the company. Before confirming the scope of incentive targets for direct shareholding, the company should conduct a thorough understanding and detailed evaluation of the work ability and professional ethics of the incentive targets to ensure that they have a fundamentally consistent understanding and expectation of the company's development direction, future plans, and strategic goals with the founding team.
二、間接持股間接持股指激勵對象通過持股平臺間接持有公司股權,實務中,常用的持股平臺主要包括有限責任公司、有限合伙企業(yè)兩類,具體如下圖所示:
2、 Indirect shareholding is an incentive for indirect stock index holders to indirectly hold company equity through shareholding platforms. In practice, commonly used shareholding platforms mainly include limited liability companies and limited partnership enterprises, as shown in the following figure:
1. 優(yōu)勢(1)保持公司控制權穩(wěn)定通過間接持股的方式,創(chuàng)始人可通過控制持股平臺來增強對公司的控制權,并進一步主導持股平臺表決權的行使。比如,以公司作為持股平臺的,持股超過50%即可取得相對控制權,持股超過67%即享有絕對控制權;新《公司法》實施后,持股平臺也可以通過設置特別表決權股的方式,使創(chuàng)始人以較少的股權享有對持股平臺具有控制力的投票權;如以有限合伙企業(yè)作為持股平臺的,創(chuàng)始人僅需持有較少的合伙份額并擔任普通合伙人便可實現(xiàn)對持股平臺的控制,在該等情形下,盡管創(chuàng)始人作為普通合伙人需對合伙企業(yè)承擔無限責任,但若該合伙企業(yè)僅作為員工持股平臺的載體而無其他經(jīng)營安排的,其整體風險相對可控。如創(chuàng)始人仍希望進一步降低無限責任風險的,可以考慮通過再設立一個夾層公司擔任普通合伙人來實現(xiàn)。(2)便于統(tǒng)一管理及風險隔離當激勵對象因離職等原因需要退出股權激勵計劃時,間接持股的安排僅需在持股平臺內(nèi)部調(diào)整股權結構或合伙份額,操作簡單快捷,不會直接影響公司的股權結構。就兩種持股平臺對比而言,有限合伙企業(yè)比有限責任公司更具有人合性,合伙人之間的權利義務關系、收益分配方式、入伙退伙程序等均可以通過合伙協(xié)議自行約定。除此之外,實踐中往往通過合伙協(xié)議授予執(zhí)行事務合伙人較大權限,除法定保留事項外,執(zhí)行事務合伙人有權單獨處理絕大部分合伙事務,包括但不限于授權其辦理退伙事項并簽署變更所需文件的權利,激勵對象進出程序靈活,這樣的設置使得有限合伙企業(yè)持股平臺更有利于公司及創(chuàng)始人加強對持股平臺的控制和對激勵對象的約束。此外,當激勵對象與公司發(fā)生爭議時,直接持股的形式極容易演變?yōu)楣蓶|訴訟,而設置持股平臺的作用,在于這道“防火墻”可以使得該等訴訟或糾紛能夠在持股平臺內(nèi)解決,從而達到風險隔離的效果。(3)上市時不直接受鎖定規(guī)則限制新《公司法》及現(xiàn)行《公司法》均規(guī)定,公司公開發(fā)行股份前已發(fā)行的股份,自公司股票在證券交易所上市交易之日起一年內(nèi)不得轉讓,即若公司存在上市計劃且在上市之前已實施股權激勵的,直接持股股東(含激勵對象)鎖定期至少為1年,實際控制人及其一致行動人的近親屬、董監(jiān)高的鎖定期根據(jù)不同上市板塊規(guī)則執(zhí)行。而現(xiàn)行監(jiān)管規(guī)則對激勵對象減持其持有的持股平臺股權或份額未進行限制,即不適用直接持股法定鎖定期1年的規(guī)則,但激勵對象有其他特殊身份,或進行自愿性承諾的除外。(4)擴大股權激勵人數(shù)當公司激勵對象人數(shù)眾多時,間接持股的方式可以通過搭設多個持股平臺,突破直接持股時的股東人數(shù)上限。
1. Advantage (1) Maintaining stable control of the company. Through indirect shareholding, founders can enhance their control over the company by controlling the shareholding platform and further lead the exercise of voting rights on the platform. For example, if a company serves as a holding platform, holding more than 50% of the shares will grant relative control, while holding more than 67% will grant absolute control; After the implementation of the new Company Law, shareholding platforms can also establish special voting rights shares to enable founders to enjoy voting rights that control the shareholding platform with less equity; If a limited partnership enterprise is used as the holding platform, the founder only needs to hold a small number of partnership shares and serve as a general partner to achieve control over the holding platform. In such a situation, although the founder as a general partner needs to bear unlimited liability for the partnership enterprise, if the partnership enterprise only serves as a carrier for employee holding platforms without other business arrangements, its overall risk is relatively controllable. If the founder still wishes to further reduce the risk of unlimited liability, it may be considered to establish another mezzanine company as a general partner to achieve this. (2) For the convenience of unified management and risk isolation, when the incentive object needs to withdraw from the equity incentive plan due to reasons such as resignation, the arrangement of indirect shareholding only requires adjusting the equity structure or partnership shares within the shareholding platform. The operation is simple and fast, and will not directly affect the company's equity structure. Compared to limited liability companies, limited partnerships are more humane in terms of the two types of shareholding platforms. The rights and obligations between partners, the distribution of profits, and the procedures for joining and leaving the partnership can all be agreed upon through the partnership agreement. In addition, in practice, the executing partner is often granted greater authority through a partnership agreement. Except for legally reserved matters, the executing partner has the right to independently handle the vast majority of partnership affairs, including but not limited to the right to authorize them to handle withdrawal matters and sign necessary documents for changes. The incentive objects have flexible entry and exit procedures, which makes the limited partnership enterprise's shareholding platform more conducive to the company and founders strengthening their control over the shareholding platform and constraining the incentive objects. In addition, when there is a dispute between the incentive object and the company, the form of direct shareholding is prone to evolve into shareholder litigation. The role of setting up a shareholding platform is that this "firewall" can enable such litigation or disputes to be resolved within the shareholding platform, thereby achieving the effect of risk isolation. (3) Both the new Company Law and the current Company Law stipulate that shares issued by a company before its public offering shall not be transferred within one year from the date of listing on the stock exchange. If the company has a listing plan and has implemented equity incentives before listing, the lock up period for direct shareholders (including incentive recipients) shall be at least one year. The lock up period for the close relatives, directors, and supervisors of the actual controller and its concerted action persons shall be executed according to the rules of different listing sectors. The current regulatory rules do not restrict incentive recipients from reducing their holdings of equity or shares in the holding platform, that is, the rule of a one-year statutory lock up period for direct shareholding does not apply, except for incentive recipients with other special identities or voluntary commitments. (4) Expanding the number of equity incentives: When a company has a large number of incentive targets, indirect shareholding can be achieved by setting up multiple shareholding platforms to break through the upper limit of direct shareholding.
2. 劣勢(1)退出通道不暢間接持股雖有其優(yōu)勢,但也存在無法回避的劣勢。對于激勵對象而言,間接持有的公司股權在公司IPO時雖不適用直接持股的法定鎖定期,但由于其無法在二級市場減持,因此其流動性和退出通常較直接持股更為狹窄。但對公司而言,這種持股模式可以較好的鼓勵激勵對象更加專注于激勵股權帶來的分紅收益,促使激勵對象積極提升公司利潤,支持和執(zhí)行公司成本控制措施以及各項制度,有助于公司的長期健康發(fā)展。(2)可能涉及雙重繳稅選擇以公司作為持股平臺的,若激勵對象通過轉讓持股平臺直接持有的公司股權實現(xiàn)變現(xiàn)的,就轉讓所得需要雙重征稅,稅收負擔較直接持股和以有限合伙企業(yè)間接持股(詳見前文:創(chuàng)始人如何選擇持股方式?)更重。
2. Disadvantage (1) The exit channel is not smooth. Although indirect shareholding has its advantages, there are also unavoidable disadvantages. For incentive recipients, although indirect holdings of company equity are not subject to the statutory lock up period for direct holdings during the company's IPO, their liquidity and exit are usually narrower than direct holdings because they cannot reduce their holdings in the secondary market. But for companies, this shareholding model can effectively encourage incentive recipients to focus more on the dividend income brought by incentive equity, encourage incentive recipients to actively improve company profits, support and implement cost control measures and various systems, and contribute to the long-term healthy development of the company. (2) Double taxation may be involved in choosing the company as the holding platform. If the incentive object realizes realization by transferring the company's equity directly held by the holding platform, the transfer income needs to be subject to double taxation, and the tax burden is heavier than direct shareholding and indirect shareholding in a limited partnership enterprise (see previous section: How do founders choose shareholding methods?).
3. 適用場景間接持股的激勵方式通常適用于公司的中高層管理人員、業(yè)務骨干以及其他優(yōu)秀員工,在符合各持股平臺人數(shù)上限的情況下,可以通過搭設多個持股平臺激勵更多的員工。
3. The incentive method of indirect shareholding is usually applicable to the middle and senior management, business backbone, and other outstanding employees of the company. In the case of meeting the upper limit of the number of employees on each shareholding platform, more employees can be incentivized by setting up multiple shareholding platforms.
總結
summary
股權流動性:直接持股,較高;間接持股,較低;
Equity liquidity: direct shareholding, relatively high; Indirect shareholding, relatively low;
鎖定期:直接持股,公司上市后至少一年;間接持股,除另有約定、承諾或具有其他需鎖定的身份外,減持其持有的持股平臺股權或份額無限制。;
Lock up period: direct shareholding, at least one year after the company goes public; Indirect shareholding, unless otherwise agreed, promised, or has other identity that needs to be locked, has no restrictions on reducing the equity or shares of the shareholding platform it holds.;
管理難度:直接持股,股權分散,較難管理;激勵對象股權變動將直接改變公司股權結構;間接持股,便于統(tǒng)一管理與約束,保持公司控制權較穩(wěn)定;激勵對象股權變動不直接改變公司股權結構;
Management difficulty: Direct shareholding, dispersed equity, difficult to manage; The equity change of the incentive object will directly change the company's equity structure; Indirect shareholding facilitates unified management and restraint, maintaining stable control over the company; The equity change of the incentive object does not directly change the company's equity structure;
稅收:直接持股,個人所得稅;間接持股,以公司作為持股平臺涉及雙重稅收;
Taxation: direct shareholding, personal income tax; Indirect shareholding, using the company as a shareholding platform involves double taxation;
適用場景:直接持股,高級管理人員、核心技術人員以及對公司發(fā)展有重大貢獻的少數(shù)核心員工;間接持股,中高層管理人員、業(yè)務骨干以及其他優(yōu)秀員工;
Applicable scenarios: direct shareholding, senior management, core technical personnel, and a small number of core employees who have made significant contributions to the company's development; Indirect shareholding, middle and senior management personnel, business backbone, and other outstanding employees;
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